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RENT CONTROL BY MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE-
NOT WITHIN HOME RULE POWER
Declaring that an inflationary spiral and a housing shortage existed
in the city, the Miami Beach City Council enacted an ordinance entitled
"Housing and Rent Control Regulations" for the purpose of solving these
problems.' Plaintiffs, several lessors directly affected by the ordinance,
filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Upon plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment, the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, declared the ordinance uncon-
stitutional.2 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida, held,
affirmed: (1) The City of Miami Beach did not have the power to enact
a rent control ordinance either pursuant to its municipal powers or to a
grant of general police power; (2) the rent control ordinance conflicted
with state law; and (3) the rent control ordinance constituted an unlawful
delegation of legislative authority. City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood
Hotel, Inc., 261 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1972).
By the common law of municipal corporations, the state legislature
is vested with all power regarding the affairs of the municipality unless
prohibited by the federal or state constitutions.3 Florida has accepted this
rule, holding that the power of the legislature is plenary except as limited
by the Florida Constitution.4 Therefore, a municipal corporation can only
exercise those powers delegated to it by the state through the constitution,
statutes, or the city charter.5 In Fleetwood, the Supreme Court of Florida
was unable to find any such delegation of power to the city to enact rent
control ordinances.
The court concluded that the power to enact a rent control ordinance
was not delegated to municipalities by article VIII, section 2 (b) of the
1968 Florida Constitution." The apparent mandate of this section is that
municipalities are given the power to conduct and perform all municipal
functions unless such powers are limited by the legislature or the con-
1. Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 1791, Oct. 15, 1969 [hereinafter cited as Ordinance
1791], provided for the regulation of rents in all private housing comprised of four or more
rental units completed before December 1, 1969, except hospitals, nursing homes, asylums,
college or school dormitories, or charitable, educational or nonprofit institutions, hotels, and
certain high rental housing accommodations, such as condominiums and co-operatives.
2. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, No. 69-17689 (Fla. Dade Co. Cir.
Ct. May 5, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Fleetwood].
3. McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government, 16 CoLum.
L. REv. 299 (1916); Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role
for the Courts, 48 Mn;rN. L. REv. 643 (1964).
4. Town of Palm Beach v. Vlahos, 153 Fla. 76, 15 So.2d 839 (1943), modified on other
grounds, 154 Fla. 159, 15 So.2d 848 (1944); State v. City of Boca Raton, 172 So.2d 230
(Fla. 1965).
S. Pursley v. City of Ft. Myers, 87 Fla. 428, 100 So. 366 (1924). Although powers are
reserved by the constitution for the cities, such a reservation is in fact a delegation from
the state to the municipalities, since all powers ultimately rest in the state. It will be re-
ferred to herein as a delegation.
6. 261 So.2d at 804.
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stitution.1 The Florida Constitution of 1885,8 under which municipalities
had only those powers expressly granted to them, is in sharp contrast
with the corresponding provision of the 1968 Constitution9 which is
intended to secure for municipalities the broad exercise of home rule
powers. 10 Consequently, under a home rule provision," the question
becomes whether the matter being legislated is of local or state concern.
In finding a lack of power in the city to control rents, the court, in
effect, said that rent control is a matter of only state concern. However,
as the dissent points out, it would appear "rent control can be a municipal
function."'" Matters pertaining to housing and to the control of land
use have often been held to be of local concern.' The Supreme Court of
Florida has held that municipalities have power to establish setback
requirements,' 4 control minimum plot size,' 5 regulate tourist camps and
trailer parks,'" provide zoning regulations, 17 and enact plans for slum
clearance and redevelopment.' 8 Each of these powers interfere with the
use of land in a like manner, requiring landowners to use their property
in a restricted fashion. Rent control is merely a different method of
imposing a similar type of regulation on the property owner. 19 The
7. Article VIII, section 2b of the 1968 Florida Constitution provides:
(b) Powers. Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary
powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal func-
tions and render municipal service, and may exercise any power for municipal pur-
poses except as otherwise provided by law.
8. Article VIII, section 8 of the Florida Constitution of 1885 provided:
The Legislature shall have power to establish, and to abolish, municipalities to pro-
vide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter
or amend the same at any time.
9. 261 So.2d at 807 (dissenting opinion) ; FLA. CONST. art. 8, § 2 (1968) (commentary).
10. See FLA. STAT. § 167.005 (1971) ; Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-29, § 1, which states:
The constitution and general laws of Florida have provided home rule powers to
municipalities and counties, except as limited by law. . . . [Gleneral laws of local
application present significant problems to local government because of the question-
able constitutionality of such legislation, as frequently reflected in court decisions
on this subject. . . . It is ...declared to be the legislative intent, by the repeal of
such legislation, to restore the regulation of local government to the constitution-
allity [sic] recognized modes of enactment. It is also the intent of the legislature to
enact additional general legislation to expand the home rule powers of local gov-
ernment.
11. The legal doctrine of home rule deals with the distribution of power between state
and local governments and the methods of allocating such power. It does not deal directly
with the question of the state or condition of local autonomy. See generally Sandalow, The
Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv.
643 (1964); 1 C. AN'.Au, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 3 (1968).
12. 261 So.2d at 808.
13. Brief of Appellant at 11, City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So.2d
801 (Fla. 1972).
14. City of Miami v. Romer, 58 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1952).
15. Garvin v. Baker, 59 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1952).
16. Egan v. City of Miami, 130 Fla. 465, 178 So. 132 (1938).
17. State ex rel. Taylor v. Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 1241, 133 So. 114 (1931).
18. Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency, 115 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1959).
19. In Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 247 (1922), the Court compared regu-
lations requiring landlords to expend large sums, stating:
To require uncompensated expenditures very certainly affects the right of property
in land as definitely, and often as seriously, as regulation of the amount of rent that
may be charged for it can do.
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peculiar characteristics of the City of Miami Beach as a tourist com-
munity providing a large amount of housing for a transient population
furnish further support for the proposition that rent control could be
considered a local rather than a state function. Judicial notice of the
peculiar characteristics of the City of Miami Beach has been taken in
a case involving aesthetic zoning."
The creation of a local-state function test as the basis of allocation
of powers under the home rule provisions places squarely in the lap of
the judiciary the basic policy choice of which level of government can
best serve the needs of the community. That the courts are the proper
place for such basic policy decisions is questionable. The effect of com-
partmentalizing governmental power into areas of municipal and state
competency is to limit municipal initiative. If the courts are free to
determine that rent control is not a municipal function, what is to stop
them from declaring that any other power not specifically delegated is
of a state rather than a local nature? Thus, the decision rendered in this
case sets a precedent for the judiciary to impose limitations upon the
powers of a municipality. Such judicial discretion, if used improperly,
could lead to contravention of the policy of homerule enunciated by the
legislature of Florida in article VIII, section 2 and its implementing
legislation.2 1 In addition, the court's use of a local-state function test fails
to recognize that some functions may be best performed by a sharing
of governmental power among the various levels of government.
A second possible source for a delegation of the power to control
rents is the charter of the city. The City of Miami Beach Charter con-
tained no express delegation of power to regulate rents. However, it did
contain a grant of the general police power of the state.2 Thus, the issue
became whether the city had the power to control rents under a general
grant of police power. The Supreme Court of Florida found that the city
did not have this power:
The weight of authority is that without specific authorization
from the state, the cities cannot enact a rent control ordinance
either incident to its specific municipal powers or under its
General Welfare provisions.23
A careful analysis of the cases comprising "the weight of authority"
indicates subtle distinctions that render such a broad general proposition
20. In City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., 45 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1949), the court
noted:
We have already recognized . . . the peculiar qualities of the community of Miami
Beach as an attraction to visitors. That is its very raison d'etre.
21. See notes 7 and 10 supra.
22. MIAMI BEAcH, FLA. CooE § 6(x) (1970) provides the city with the power
6(x) [t]o adopt all ordinances or do all things deemed necessary or expedient for
promoting or maintaining the general welfare, comfort, education, morals, peace,
health, and convenience of said city, or its inhabitants and to exercise all of the
powers and privileges conferred upon cities or towns by the general law of Florida,
when not inconsistent herewith.
23. 261 So.2d at 804.
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suspect. 4 In Warren v. City of Philadelphia,25 the "Philadelphia Rent
Control Ordinance of 1955," which had subsequently been suspended,
was held void not because of the absence of authority in the city to
enact it without an express grant, but because the evidence produced by
the plaintiffs was sufficient to overcome the presumption that an emer-
gency existed. In that case the court relied upon a previous decision of
the same name challenging the original Philadelphia Rent Control
Ordinance in which it had held that the enactment of a rent control
ordinance by a city clothed with the general police power is within the
power of the city, unless it is arbitrary and unreasonable.'
Henbeck v. City of Baltimore,7 the second case constituting the
"weight of authority," saw the court invalidate the rent control legislation
because it conflicted with the general public law, not because the city
lacked the power to enact it. The court stated that the city, under its
police power,
ha[d] the power to enact rent control legislation, even in the
absence of an enabling act, provided such legislation [was] not
in conflict with the Constitution or any Public General Law
thereof.
2
In Grofo Realty Co. v. Bayonne,0 it was held that the City of
Bayonne, New Jersey, did not possess the power to enact rent control
legislation under a general grant of police power where the state had
passed a statute regarding the control of rents. The court held that the
state had preempted this area and that the exercise of a similar power by
the city under a general grant of the police power would be inconsistent
with state power. In another New Jersey decision, Wagner v. Mayor
and Municipal Council of City of Newark,"0 the court ruled that in
light of a history of rent control by the state legislature and a state
enactment calling for uniform controls, it would be incongruous to find
that the city had the power to enact rent control under its general
police powers. In Fleetwood, however, the court did not allude that the
proposition of preemption was applicable to the case at bar.
Finally, Old Colony Gardens, Inc. v. City of Sanford"1 is cited in
Fleetwood for the proposition that "a city charter conferring police
24. It should be noted that the question is not whether the regulation of rent is an ex-
ercise of the police power, but rather whether a general grant by the state of that police
power includes the power to control rents. As early as 1923, the United States Supreme
Court held that the existence of an exigency will justify the legislature's exercise of its police
power to restrict an owner's right in land through the use of rent controls. Block v. Hirsh,
256 U.S. 134 (1921).
25. 387 Pa. 362, 127 A.2d 703 (1956).
26. Warren v. City of Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 380, 115 A.2d 218 (1955).
27. 205 Md. 203, 107 A.2d 99 (1954).
28. Id. at 206, 107 A.2d at 101.
29. 24 N.J. 482, 132 A.2d 802 (1957).
30. 24 N.J. 467, 132 A.2d 794 (1957).
31. 147 Conn. 60, 156 A.2d 515 (1959).
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power in general terms [does] not empower the city to adopt a rent
control ordinance." 2 This language, however, is misleading unless viewed
in light of the peculiar facts of Old Colony. Connecticut had adopted
rent control legislation and had terminated rent control by statute in
1959, declaring that rent controls were no longer needed in the interest
of the public health, safety, and welfare and that the city could not
enact such legislation under a general grant of police power because to
do so would be contrary to public policy. While not obvious from its
decision, it may be that the court in Fleetwood considered a lack of any
state proclamation on the subject as a positive statement that rent control
was not needed as a matter of public policy. Nevertheless, Florida has
neither a history of rent control as a state function, nor has it preempted
the rent control area by legislative enactment. It has not declared that
rent control is unnecessary in the interest of the public health, safety, or
welfare. In Fleetwood, the matter of the existence of an emergency was
not in question. In fact, the Florida courts have recognized the particular
applicability of the police power to a limited geographical area:
In considering the matter of police power, as applied by
municipalities, it must not be overlooked that in congested and
heavily populated areas problems are presented which call for
application of regulations which may not be required through-
out the state generally .... 11
Thus, it is clear that "the weight of authority" need not have precluded
the enactment of a rent control ordinance by a municipality under a
general grant of police power unless the ordinance conflicted with a state
statute or the constitution.
In Fleetwood, the court found that the City of Miami Beach rent
control ordinance conflicted with Florida Statutes sections 83.03, 83.04,
83.06 and 83.20 (1971)."8 It is well settled that municipal ordinances
are subordinate to state statutes and that if they conflict the municipal
ordinance is of no force.8 5 While some courts have held that when doubt
exists as to whether there is such a conflict, the controversy should be
resolved in favor of the statute.3 It has also been held that in passing
upon the validity of a municipal ordinance, the ordinance should be
construed to be legal if at all possible. 7 It would appear that the rent
32. 261 So.2d at 804.
33. City of Miami v. Girtman, 104 So.2d 62, 66 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958). See also State
ex rel. Ellis v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 56 Fla. 858, 864, 47 So. 358, 360 (1908), which de-
clared:
The difficulty of making specific enumeration of all such power as the Legislature
may intend to delegate to municipal corporations renders it necessary to confer
powers in general terms.
34. 261 So.2d at 806.
35. 261 So.2d at 806; City of Wilton Manors v. Sterling, 121 So.2d 172 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1960); City of Coral Gables v. Siefeith, 87 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1956).
36. City of Wilton Manors v. Sterling, 121 So.2d 172, 174 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
37. City of Miami v. Kayfetz, 92 So.2d 798 (Fla. 1957).
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control ordinance defeats neither the intent nor the object of the state
statutes. Florida Statutes chapter 83 (1971)88 deals with the basic
relationship between landlord and tenant. In no way does it relate to
control of rent. On the other hand, the rent control ordinance does not
deal with the basic relationship between landlord and tenant. It deals
strictly with the restriction of rents to a reasonable amount during
periods of emergency. Furthermore, chapter 83 was passed to set a basis
for the landlord-tenant relationship during normal conditions. It is not
clear that chapter 83 should preclude municipalities from supplementing
the state law where an emergency housing shortage and an inflationary
spiral exist simultaneously.
The court also ignored the possibility of concurrent state and
municipal regulation. Florida has recognized such schemes of regulation
provided that the municipal ordinance can be read to accomplish a pur-
pose within the compass of the state statutes9 and that the ordinance
supplements the state law.4 The rent control ordinance can be viewed
as supplementing chapter 83, with the intent of preserving the statutory
goals under extraordinary conditions.
The third ground for invalidating the City of Miami Beach rent
control ordinance was that some of its provisions unlawfully delegated
legislative authority to the city rent agency.4 The test for the delegation
of legislative power is well settled:
The Legislature may not delegate the power to enact a law,
or to declare what the law shall be, or to exercise an unrestricted
discretion in applying the law; but it may enact a law, complete
in itself, designed to accomplish a general public purpose, and
may expressly authorize designated officials within definite valid
limitations to provide rules and regulations for the complete
operation and enforcement of the law within its expressed
general purpose.4"
The delegation of power must contain objective standards and guide-
lines, or such standards should be capable of being reasonably inferred.43
The same rules which apply to the delegation of legislative authority by
the state legislature apply to the delegation of authority by a municipality
to a city agency.44 The court in Fleetwood found that Ordinance 1791
delegated unbridled discretion to one person, the city rent administrator.4 5
38. Hereinafter referred to as chapter 83.
39. Atwater v. City of Sarasota, 38 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1949) (dealing with the licensing
of plumbers).
40. Egan v. City of Miami, 130 Fla. 465, 178 So. 132 (1938).
41. 261 So.2d at 805.
42. State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 636, 47 So. 969, 976 (1908); Ex
parte Lewis, 101 Fla. 624, 631, 135 So. 147, 151 (1931); Stewart v. Stone, 130 So.2d 577,
579 (Fla. 1961).
43. Smith v. Portante, 212 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1968).
44. Blith v. City of Ocala, 142 Fla. 612, 195 So. 406 (1940).
45. 261 So.2d at 806.
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This is questionable in that the ordinance clearly provides for control
by a committee of not less than ten."6 It also defines the type of housing
to be controlled,47 establishes the basis for the maximum rent to be
charged, 48 defines the circumstances under which adjustments of maxi-
mum rents may be made by the city rent agency,49 and finally the provi-
sions state objective guidelines for the exercise of power by the city rent
agency.
In sum, while Fleetwood precludes the establishment of rent con-
trols by a municipality in the absence of enabling state legislation, it
has far broader implications. The judicial limitation on the home rule
powers of municipalities, imposed by the creation of a local-state function
test for allocating power, effectively places basic policy choices on the
judicial branch of the government. It is submitted that the courts are
neither the proper forum for such decisions to be made, nor are they
the best mechanism for determining the needs of the people at any
particular time.
RICHARD A. HERMAN
MERCHANT-BUYER'S GOOD FAITH DUTY TO INQUIRE
UNDER 9-307: A CONFUSION, OF CONCEPTS
The plaintiff, J. I. Case Company, sold a tractor to Florida Tractor
Mart, Inc., and took back a security agreement (a conditional sales
contract), and a financing statement which it recorded.' Florida Tractor
then delivered possession of the tractor to Gator Tractor Company
pursuant to an oral lease.2 Shortly thereafter Gator Tractor traded the
tractor to the defendant, Swift, in exchange for three other items of
equipment
46. Section 16.A.3.C. of Ordinance 1791, provides:
There shall be an advisory committee composed of not less than 10 members who
shall be appointed by the city council. The committee shall be provided by the ad-
ministrator with all data necessary for it to advise and consult with the Mayor and
City Council for all its actions. (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Justice Ervin, in his dissent, points out that the city rent agency is a branch of the
Miami Beach government and as such is subject to the controls of, and accountable to
the Mayor and city council. 261 So.2d at 811.
47. See note 1 supra.
48. See note 41 supra.
49. See note 39 supra.
1. See FLA. STAT. § 679.302(1) (1971). Florida has adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code in cbs. 671-79 FLA. STAT. (1971). The Code sections correspond to the last four
numbers of the statute section.
2. Once Case Company's security interest was perfected, it continued, despite the
leasing of the tractor by Florida Tractor to Gator Tractor. FLa. STAT. § 679.306(2) (1971).
3. The exchange of equipment between Swift and Gator Tractor constituted a "buying"
and therefore Swift became a "buyer" of the tractor. FLA. STAT. § 671.201(9) (1971).
